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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY: 
CATASTROPHE THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 
Todd A. Wildermuth* 
Take the moment the trembling starts. Where do you go?  
Where does your mind go? 
There are the things you know you should do with your 
body: drop to the ground, take cover, hold on, stay where you 
are. 
There are the things you know you should do with your 
thoughts: Where is your family? Are they doing the same? Are 
they safe? Can you get to them? 
In the rush of those thoughts come the surprising ones, the 
kinds of ideas that appear in a moment of forced clarity. These 
are not the questions that come naturally or in the course of 
normal days; a certain separation of the body and the mind is 
required. They come only with certain trembling of the spirit, 
with a rupture in all that seems usual. And they are rooted in, 
of all things, wonder. 
Wonder over how life came to be at all; that something came 
from nothing can only be a wonder.  How did that happen, 
anyway? Somewhere, some time, somehow: a sun, a planet just 
the right distance from it, billions of years, elements that 
became compounds that became life that became us. Us, with 
our eyes and hands and skin and bones that serve so well in so 
many moments but seem, in this one, somehow not quite built 
right. “Thy life’s a miracle,” and no less amazingly than now. 
That you may not “[s]peak yet again” cannot take away that 
you have spoken at all—indeed that human speech exists at 
all.1 
                                               
* Todd A. Wildermuth, Director, Environmental Law Program, University of 
Washington School of Law. 
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 4, sc. 6 (Jay L. Halio ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2005) (“Thy life’s a miracle. Speak yet again.”). For an extended treatment and 
contemplation, see WENDELL BERRY, LIFE IS A MIRACLE: AN ESSAY AGAINST MODERN 
SUPERSTITION (2001). 
252 WASH. J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y [Vol. 7:2 
 
Wonder over your survival beyond childhood. So many close 
calls, long forgotten, come now easily to mind. You have been 
here before—not exactly but close enough. The rise in 
adrenaline recalls those long-ago moments: fear unforeseen, 
fear realized, fear overcome. All packed away in your chest of 
life experiences and kept, somewhere inside, as a store called 
upon—consciously or not—to keep the thing that is you going. 
That humans spend so many years as vulnerable, 
inexperienced children seems now both precious and foolish. 
Why such slow progress through years that could be used 
living rather than learning to live? Why such a long 
apprenticeship in life? And given those years of chance and 
experiment and foolish youth, how does anyone make it 
through? 
Wonder that our kind has separated so much from the other 
kinds that came up with us. How did one line become a heron, 
another a salmon, and ours a human? Time, chance, and more 
time, surely enough; it is a rational and utterly believable 
explanation, yet unsatisfying all the same. That branching is 
so hard to see, never mind that this trembling instant has 
slowed your sense of time to an infinity. Through how many 
unimaginably tedious accretions, through how many 
explosions of punctuated radiation, did strings of organic 
chemicals turn to wings, gills, scales, skins, fur, tails, forelegs, 
and fetlocks? Why some of those things to them, our traveling 
companions, and other things to us? The logic of the tortoise 
carapace or the chitinous shell suddenly takes on the character 
of genius. That humans bear no exoskeleton seems, 
momentarily at least, a serious design flaw. 
And wonder that the special endowments of our kind—the 
opposable thumb, the upright stance, the large brain—have 
built such an unusual and novel second world of complex 
human creation. Without us there are no canvas packs, no 
cars, no computers, no cedar canoes, no carved gods; there are 
no swaying superhighways, vibrating highrises, crumbling 
asphalt, or caving bridges. All of that wonderful creation 
moving so steadily forward on all other days but this one. All of 
that wonderful creation: admirable for its complexity, for its 
own cleverness in coming together in space and time to serve 
our rich imaginations and bodily needs. Mighty one day, weak 
another; sturdy and knowable under normal circumstances, 
but fallible and mysterious right now. 
As these wonders jumble together, drift apart, and join once 
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again, the moment of clarity becomes sharper as the usual 
world is becoming less recognizable. 
You realize there is a difference between knowing, and 
knowing what to do. 
*** 
We know far more about certain catastrophic risks than we 
have been willing to do anything serious about. This was not 
always the case, of course. There was a time when we could 
have plausibly said we had no real knowledge of a problem and 
therefore no possible obligation to do anything different. For 
climate change, the nuances of the date can be endlessly 
debated; the possible window puts Americans knowing 
somewhere between 1896, with transatlantic arrival of 
scientific findings from Sweden, and no later than James 
Hansen’s testimony before Congress in 1988.2 For the threats 
posed by a Cascadia fault megaquake, the range of possibility 
is smaller, with clear establishment somewhere in the early 
1990s.3 In either case, however, no fewer than two decades 
have passed since a core idea was established and no powerful 
contrary evidence has countered it. We have moved from 
ignorance, to knowledge of an existential threat, to inaction at 
any meaningful or suitable scale. 
Tempting as it is to look backward and condemn inaction, 
the more necessary concern at present must be how to look 
forward and think urgently about rapid action. The complex 
world we have made on top of the prior world was built, we 
now see, on ignorant assumptions. We did not know then what 
we know now. Our concerns were not the concerns of the 
builders of the superhighways, or the coastal ports, or the 
downtowns, or the energy grids, or the communication 
networks; they could not have built or planned with knowledge 
we have but they did not. At all points in time, policy thinking 
and project planning are informed by the knowledge of that 
moment. 
                                               
2. Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 24, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-
expert-tells-senate.html?pagewanted=all. 
3. SANDI DOUGHTON, FULL-RIP 9:0 THE NEXT EARTHQUAKE IN THE PACIFIC 
NORTHWEST 37 (Gary Luke ed. 2013) (“By the early 1990s, scientific skepticism [over 
the historic recurrence of Cascadia megaquakes] had vanished under the weight of the 
evidence . . . .”). 
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It is not irrelevant who knew what when, or where they 
might have made better decisions; there may come a good day 
for that reckoning. But it is vastly more relevant, and more 
urgent, to decide what we should do now. A less important 
question is why those people back then did not act on the 
knowledge they had in their time. The more important 
question is why we today, with better knowledge, are failing to 
act on what we know. 
*** 
Making analogies from individual behavior to societal 
behavior is fraught with danger.  The two spheres, individual 
and collective, are not the same; an attempt to treat them on 
the same terms must always confront its own fiction. Still, 
some fictions can be useful fictions so I will briefly attempt to 
maintain one here: an argument that we can use a body of 
psychological science as if it applied to society at large. In 
doing so, I believe, we might better think about planning for, 
setting policy for, and enacting legislation for coping with the 
catastrophic threats of both climate change and megaquakes. 
*** 
Daniel Kahneman has spent his professional life, much of it 
in partnership Amos Tversky, studying certain foibles of 
human decision-making—the internal patterns of thought that 
lead to beliefs, which in turn inform decisions, which shape 
actions, which humans use to remake the world.4 Kahneman 
collected much of his life’s work into a 2011 book, Thinking, 
Fast and Slow.5 Borrowing from his own research and the 
research of others, Kahneman creates the central metaphor of 
his book by drawing a distinction between two “systems” of 
human thought: System 1 and System 2.6 
The two systems work in tandem but have different modes 
and play different roles. System 1 “operates automatically and 
quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary 
                                               
4. On the extraordinary intellectual partnership of Kahneman and Tversky, see 
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT: A FRIENDSHIP THAT CHANGED OUR MINDS 
(2016). 
5. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
6. Id. at 29 (“System 1 and System 2 are so central to the story I tell in this book 
that I must make it absolutely clear that they are fictitious characters.”). 
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control.”7 System 2, in contrast, “allocates attention to the 
effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex 
computations.”8 We can think of these two systems 
alternatively as an “automatic” one (System 1) and an 
“effortful” one (System 2).9 We go about our days regularly 
cycling back and forth between these two systems, cruising in 
a low-effort mode for most things and then pausing 
occasionally to work a bit harder concentrating on a difficult 
task. 
Kahneman gives each system its due, and a rightful sphere 
of excellence: “The automatic operations of System 1 generate 
surprisingly complex patterns of ideas, but only the slower 
System 2 can construct thoughts in an orderly series of 
steps.”10 He credits System 2 with a special kind of human 
privilege, noting that the “operations of System 2 are often 
associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and 
concentration”11—in other words, with the things that humans 
use to consider ourselves as free-willed, sentient, purposeful 
actors in the world. 
But do not become overly enamored of System 2, Kahneman 
warns. He cautions that System 2 is more akin to “a 
supporting character who believes herself to be the hero” than 
the true lead actor: “the thoughts and actions that System 2 
believes it has chosen are often guided by the figure at the 
center of the story, System 1.”12 
How do the two systems trade off? Kahneman summarizes: 
“[M]ost of what you (your System 2) think and do originates in 
your System 1, but System 2 takes over when things get 
difficult, and it normally has the last word.”13 
But why, we might ask, all the bother with two systems at 
all? Why did they not just combine over time into, for example, 
a sort of moderate-effort SuperSystem 1 that manages 
everything? Kahneman credits the tandem system with, 
among other things, great energy management for the human 
                                               
7. Id. at 20. 
8. Id. at 21. 
9. Id. at 29. 
10. Id. at 21. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 31. 
13. Id. at 25. 
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mind: “[t]he division of labor between System 1 and System 2 
is highly efficient: it minimizes effort and optimizes 
performance.”14 
System 1 can run routine matters on low-energy autopilot to 
navigate the usual courses most of the time.15 System 2 kicks 
in when there is unusual turbulence, when a gate-change is 
required, or when one’s daily flight needs to be rerouted to an 
alternative destination; all of which requires careful, critical 
effort and higher energy.16 
Much of the time, the autopilot-like function works right, or 
close to right enough: “System 1 is generally very good at what 
it does: its models of familiar situations are accurate, its short-
term predictions are usually accurate as well, and its initial 
reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate.”17 
Alas, System 1 has its flaws. System 1 leads us to any 
number of biases, which Kahneman and others have described 
and are by now well known in many details.18 Worse yet, 
System 1 occasionally tricks System 2 into remaining 
(inappropriately) dormant and drags the whole operation 
down. “Biases cannot always be avoided,” Kahneman writes, 
“because System 2 may have no clue to the error.”19 Not least, 
“there are vital tasks that only System 2 can perform because 
they require effort and acts of self-control in which the 
[incorrect] intuitions and impulses of System 1 are 
overcome.”20 System 1, often so reliable, can fail—and its worst 
failures are those that fail to cue System 2 even to the 
possibility of error.21 
Which might seem like a case for spending more time with 
one’s System 2. Yet this, too, has its downsides.  
Certain errors, Kahneman admits, “can be prevented only by 
the enhanced monitoring and effortful activity of System 2.”22 
One could conceivably keep System 2 on a state of constant 
                                               
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 20. 
16. Id. at 21. 
17. Id. at 25. 
18. Id.; see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011) (exploring the impact of our biases on regulatory policy). 
19. KAHNEMAN, supra note 5, at 28. 
20. Id. at 31. 
21. Id. at 28. 
22. Id. 
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high alert in order to keep System 1 from mistakes. For a short 
duration, in situations of grave danger, an all-System-2 all-
the-time kind of approach might be appropriate. Beyond a 
short duration, however, trouble follows. “As a way to live your 
life… continuous vigilance is not necessarily good, and it is 
certainly impractical.”23 
And it is here that Kahneman’s research on individuals 
leads to solid advice-by-analogy to our society at large when we 
are faced with tough policy challenges such as climate change 
and megaquakes: 
Constantly questioning our own thinking would be 
impossibly tedious, and System 2 is much too slow and 
inefficient to serve as a substitute for System 1 in 
making routine decisions. The best we can do is a 
compromise: learn to recognize situations in which 
mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant 
mistakes when the stakes are high.24 
We cannot remain on high alert at all times. Minds tire from 
the constant effort; their function diminishes. We can, 
however, force ourselves, collectively and selectively, to expend 
the extra mental effort when the danger of inattention is 
great—as, of course, it is in the instances of climate change 
and megaquakes. 
A few other small pieces of Kahneman’s research can help 
complete the usefulness of this proposed analogy. 
When System 1 is challenged by a particularly tough 
problem, “the machinery of intuitive thought does the best it 
can.”25 Which is to say, as Kahneman and others describe it, 
the mind frequently appeals to “heuristics,” a kind of System 1 
shortcut, or shotgun approach, to finding an idea that seems 
applicable to the challenging circumstances.26 Heuristics have 
the usual advantages of System 1: speed, energy efficiency, 
and a close-enough quality that renders them mostly useful to 
the individual most of the time—or at least not frequently 
harmful. When System 1 activates a heuristic, System 2 is 
bypassed or otherwise not engaged. 
Unfortunately, a heuristic is an “alternative to careful 
                                               
23. Id. 
24. Id. (emphasis added). 
25. Id. at 12. 
26. Id. at 98. 
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reasoning”; it is not actual reasoning itself.27 Challenge or 
novelty calls, one would think, for more active use of System 2. 
Yet System 2 is, for all its power (or perhaps precisely because 
of it), often reluctant to draw on our limited stores of mental 
energy. Kahneman calls it “lazy.”28 
System 2 always technically has the opportunity to detect, 
review, and reject intuitive answers (heuristics), but it often 
does not: 
[A] lazy system 2 often follows the path of least effort 
and endorses a heuristic answer without much scrutiny 
of whether it is truly appropriate. You will not be 
stumped, you will not have to work very hard, and you 
may not even notice that you did not answer the 
question you were asked.  Furthermore, you may not 
realize that the target question was difficult, because 
an intuitive answer to it came readily to mind . . . .29 
Kahneman calls this latter process, quite logically, the 
“substitution” of an easier question for a harder one.30 We do it 
all the time—indeed, substitution captures the “essence of 
intuitive heuristics: when faced with a difficult question, we 
often answer an easier one instead, usually without noticing 
the substitution.”31 
*** 
Turn back to our concerns with catastrophe. Where, we 
might ask, have we committed collective System 1 errors? 
Where have we applied shotgun heuristics when careful 
reasoning would be required? When have we substituted an 
answer to an easier question for a harder-to-reach answer to a 
much tougher question? 
We have done these things time and again. We have, 
culturally and politically speaking, applied System 1 responses 
to System 2 questions. As a result, when we do pause long 
enough to look at data, when we are able to free ourselves from 
the conventional wisdom, when we dig in a bit, we find our 
                                               
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 46 (“‘Lazy’ is a harsh judgment . . . but it does not seem to be [from the 
evidence] unfair.”). 
29. Id. at 99. 
30. See id. at 97–105. 
31. Id. at 12. 
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System 2 selves staring squarely at inadequate System 1 
responses to important problems. 
Climate change has been widely acknowledged as a “super 
wicked problem,” one fraught with, among other things, global 
politics, split incentives, and the momentum of high 
investments in public and private infrastructure.32 It poses, in 
Kahneman’s theory, the kind of challenges that System 1 is 
notoriously bad at.33 
Not only does climate change require stretching one’s mind 
over the planet and imagining tons of invisible, odorless gas 
(CO2). It also demands some ability to grasp statistical 
concepts—such as the difference between climate and weather, 
or between a given pattern of summer heat compared with 
patterns of summer heat that preceded it, or the likelihood 
that any given series of temperatures or rainfalls clustered 
simply by chance. System 1 is poor at statistics because 
statistics “requires thinking about many things at once, which 
is something that System 1 is not designed to do.”34 
Climate change does not establish clear certainties: it 
changes the odds of various outcomes over time and over the 
entire planet. Our understanding of climate change deals in 
possible alternatives made more likely, not definite outcomes 
made more certain.35 Our individual System-1-led minds 
struggle with the lack of direct cause associated with a certain 
effect. We struggle with the absence of firm narrative 
coherence, which our minds crave. Our climate policies and 
planning seem to suffer for it. 
                                               
32. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1153 (2009). 
33. See id. at 1173–78 (highlighting problems that require long-term, thoughtful 
responses). 
34. KAHNEMAN, supra note 5, at 13. 
35. The most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports 
show that predictions about future conditions are qualified twice—first with a 
statement about statistical likelihood and second with a statement about confidence. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 10 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf (“The global mean surface 
temperature change for the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986–2005 … will likely be in 
the range 0.3°C to 0.7°C (medium confidence).”). See also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GUIDANCE NOTE FOR LEAD AUTHORITES OF THE IPCC FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT ON CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES (2010), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf (discussing 
the IPCC’s treatment of probabilistic predictions). 
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Pacific coast megaquakes operate similarly on our minds. 
Though perhaps not quite super wicked, they are mentally 
tough all the same: they deal with ranges of possibility, the 
consideration of multiple alternatives, and pure seismic 
stochasticity. Taking only the Cascadia fault, we cannot know 
where the subduction plate will release (the epicenter), how 
much energy it will release, what date and time it will quake, 
for how long any given location will shake, and what secondary 
shocks will be induced.36 The energy that would carry outward 
from the subduction zone would act on a built environment 
that is in a constant state of tinkering and reconstruction. 
Absent anything close to complete or sufficient knowledge, we 
can only work in ranges of possibilities and approximations. To 
the extent our preparations and policies can have any reasoned 
basis, that basis must be at root statistical, perhaps combined 
with brute-force computational simulation.  
For those who have slowed down in a System 2 way to 
engage climate change and megaquakes alike, there must be a 
persistent sense of banging one’s head against a very hard and 
unyielding wall. Both cases threaten very real, potential 
catastrophes—events likely over many years but impossible to 
pinpoint to any given moment or place. Addressing such 
catastrophes squarely has required, does require, and will 
further require a kind of sustained System 2 “continuous 
vigilance” that Kahneman says is so hard for an individual to 
maintain—the state of intense attention he has called not “a 
good way to live your life.”37 What is our alternative, though? 
*** 
                                               
36. In the absence of our ability to predict earthquakes, scientists and emergency 
managers have focused on the creation of early warning systems that activate and 
communicate the moment an active earthquake begins—i.e., that provide warning by a 
fast, electronic signal to human ears and communication devices before the somewhat 
slower incoming wave of the earthquake’s released energy arrives.  Such systems aim 
to provide “seconds to minutes” of warning using today’s technology. See, e.g., ERIN R. 
BURKETT ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS FACT SHEET NO. 2014-3083, 
SHAKEALERT—AN EARTHQUAKE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED STATES 
WEST COAST 4 (Feb. 2017), https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/fs20143083. The early 
warning system for the UW West Coast is called ShakeAlert; a version 1.2 prototype of 
the system was rolled out to limited public and private partners on April 10, 2017.  
“ShakeAlert” Earthquake Early Warning System Goes West Coast Wide, UNITED 
STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.usgs.gov/news/shakealert-
earthquake-early-warning-system-goes-west-coast-wide. 
37. KAHNEMAN, supra note 5, at 28. 
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Fortunately, the analogy between policy thinking and 
individual thinking is only an analogy. No one human being, 
thankfully, needs to maintain the state of constant vigilance. 
No one human being could be watchful enough for us all, or 
sustain System 2 performance long enough.  Even if possible, it 
would not be sufficient. Policy requires collective action and 
collective actors. 
For a number of reasons, we can be confident that we are 
capable of a sustained, effective, and collective System 2 effort. 
First, System 2 thinking may be hard for individuals to 
sustain in daily matters, but it is manageable for groups of 
individuals organized around institutions and shared aims. We 
build institutions, public and private, to outlive the individuals 
within them; institutional purpose is longer and greater than 
the institution’s temporary operators. When we cannot sustain 
an effort on our own, yet know that effort to be necessary or 
useful—the manufacture of goods, the delivery of products, the 
care of the infirm—we develop institutions. We have not, in 
our policy and law-making, given enough effortful System 2 
thought to catastrophe, but we know that we have the 
collective capacity for the effort. 
Second, it is tempting to say that even a hard problem can 
have a simple solution. Entire societies of ants have conquered 
the earth with a relatively limited sense of a few social codes.38 
At the human scale, from a fairly small set of policy responses, 
the underlying drivers of climate change can be altered, 
redirected, and potentially reversed.39 Indeed, a good case has 
been made that second or third-best climate solutions can pave 
the way to first-best ones; a society need not discern or achieve 
the best response on the first try to set an ultimately corrective 
course.40 System 1 thinking—proximate heuristics or close-
enough policies—are not entirely hopeless when writ large. 
Certain policy approaches might just be right enough 
frequently enough to permit a flurry of activity and then an 
increasingly lazy use of our collective System 2. 
Third, the image of consistent, persistent, effortful System 2 
                                               
38. See generally BERT HÖLLDOBLER & EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SUPERORGANISM: 
THE BEAUTY, ELEGANCE, AND STRANGENESS OF INSECT SOCIETIES (2008) (social 
organization of ants). 
39. Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCIENCE 1170, 
1170 (2015). 
40. Id. 
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analysis can suggest a distracting, and thankfully faulty, 
image: that our corrective actions must be carried out chiefly 
by government agencies or expert technocrats. Surely expert 
analysis is needed. Climate models and seismic hazard 
scenarios require sustained expertise, with highly educated 
scientists and significant funding to support their research. To 
make effective policy from that expertise, lawmakers and 
others will need to take seriously the need for System-1-
challenging statistical projection. However, we can use an 
effortful, statistical mode of thinking to understand and 
analyze a threat, and then move on to pursue policy by any 
number of methods. 
Given the shared stakes—again, catastrophe is not some 
remote possibility but a demonstrable threat—a society will 
rightfully seek some kind of firm, coercive response, i.e., some 
infringements on individual liberty for the tradeoff of greater 
individual security. This, of course, invokes law, duly debated 
and executed. Law has many guises: regulation, yes, but also 
government support for education and outreach, for insurance 
subsidy, for creating the rules that lead to new market 
formation. Where a culture of individual preparation exists, 
governments can reduce its efforts in that area; where a robust 
private insurance market exists, governments need not 
meddle. A collective System 2 approach to large-scale 
catastrophe planning seems as legitimate a purpose of 
government as there can be, i.e. a way to organize effort to 
collective benefit when individuals could not achieve the same 
aim acting on their own. Still, government need not actively 
control or dictate the exact terms of all, or even most, 
resilience preparation. 
Lastly, the project ahead should be to continually engage a 
collective System 2 to assess catastrophic potential, normalize 
the critical discoveries through education, and then move the 
policy action back to the collective System 1. In individual 
lives, many things that were once effortful and required 
activation of System 2 became over time normalized; once 
adopted, System 1 begins to carry them out as part of a new 
normal, as a less effortful exercise of learned expertise. We 
might treat the formation of catastrophe policy as akin to 
getting through a rough path of turbulence by actively seeking 
a new altitude and then returning to autopilot. One need not, 
in carrying out daily activities that are shaped by policy, be 
vigilant about—or even particularly aware of—the System 2 
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thinking that informed the policy formation. We only need to 
have reliable confidence that, while cruising through our lives 
largely in our individual System 1s, that the collective System 
2 has been invoked on our behalf. 
That way, when the shaking—metaphorical or otherwise—
starts and our wondering begins, we can wonder with more 
hope than fear, more uninvited amazement than uninvited 
terror. At that first tremor, maybe we will be able to find a 
modest comfort: that we have taken measures; that they were 
informed by the best of our deliberate, collective efforts; and 
that the world we have made might just accommodate the 
buckle and sway coming upon us. 
 
